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INTRODUCTION 
German psychiatrist and neuropathologist Dr. Alois Alzheimer deliv-
ered a lecture in 1906 to fellow psychiatrists summarizing the case of Frau 
Auguste Deter, who first consulted him in 1901 when she was 51 years old. 1 
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Article is dedicated to the author's mother, Margaret A. Murphy (1927-2012), who suffered 
from this disease. 
1. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE EDUC. & REFERRAL (ADEAR) CTR., NAT'L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE FACT SHEET 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/alzheimers _disease_ fact_sheet.pdf; see also Kon-
rad Maurer, Stephan Yolk & Hector Gerbaldo, Auguste D and Alzheimer's Disease, 349 
LANCET 1546, 1546 ( 1997), available at http://alzheimer.neurology.ucla.edu/pubs/alzheimer 
Lancet. pdf. 
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She told him, "I have lost myself."2 He studied Deter's brain after she died 
at age 55 and found "there were plaques, neurofibrillary tangles, and arteri-
osclerotic changes."3 This complex of signs and symptoms came to be 
known as Alzheimer's disease (AD).4 As of 2012, an estimated 5.4 million 
Americans suffer from the disease.5 By the year 2030, "the segment of the 
U.S. population age 65 and older is expected to double, and the estimated 
71 million older Americans will make up approximately 20 percent of the 
total population."6 According to studies, the incidence of AD "doubles for 
every 5-year interval past age 65.m Because an estimated one in eight 
Americans over the age of 65 currently have symptoms of AD,8 courts will 
increasingly need to resolve evidentiary issues involving parties, defend-
ants, witnesses, and victims in various stages of the disease. This is particu-
larly important because "in January 2011, America reached a significant 
milepost when the oldest 'baby boomers' turned 65."9 Obviously, testimony 
at trial often includes descriptions of events that happened in the past and 
thus frequently involves memory. 
This Article explores three specific areas of evidence that will be af-
fected by the changing demographic of our population and the consequent 
increase in the number of individuals with AD: first, the Rule 601 compe-
tence rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence; second, the 804 unavailability 
requirement; and third, the Confrontation Clause contained within the Sixth 
Amendment. Part I of this Article describes the disease and how it specifi-
cally differs from other mental and physical illnesses that may impact 
memory. 10 Part II addresses the general rule of competency and AD. 11 Part 
III examines the requirement of "unavailability" for the second set of excep-
2. See Maurer, Volk & Gerba!do,supra note I, at 1548. 
3. /d. at 1546. 
4. Alzheimer's disease is only definitively diagnosed after death by a physical 
examination of the individual's brain. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE EDUC. & REFERRAL (AD EAR) 
CTR., supra note 1, at 5. Physicians diagnose AD based upon symptoms, but only a brain 
examination proves actual AD. See id. 
5. ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, 2012 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 14 (2012), 
available at http://www.alz.org/down1oads/facts _figures_ 20 12.pdf. 
6. /d. at 18; see also Sharon B. Gardner, Catharine Coble Armstrong & Denise 
Rashti, Dementia and Legal Capacity: What Lawyers Should Know When Dealing with 
Expert Witnesses, 6 NAT'LACAD. ELDER L. ATTORNEYS]. 131, 132 (2010). 
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2010 PROGRESS REPORT ON 
ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/defau1t/files/20 10 _ alzheimers _disease _progress _report_.pdf. 
8. See ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, supra note 5, at 14. 
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 5. The term "Baby 
Boomers" refers to those born between the years 1946 and 1964. See Josephine Gittler, Col-
loquium at the University of Iowa College of Law (Jan. 12, 2012), available at 
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/nh1p/?page _id= 190. 
10. See infra Part I. 
11. See infra Part II. 
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tions to the hearsay rule with a view toward this disease. 12 Part IV sets forth 
how AD may affect the right of a defendant to confront witnesses. 13 Part V 
presents possible solutions and advice for facing the future onslaught of 
cases involving individuals who are diagnosed with or suffering from the 
disease. 14 Finally, the Article concludes with thoughts for the future. 15 
I. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND MEMORY 
Alzheimer's disease is the most common type of dementia, accounting 
for 60 to 80% of cases. 16 According to the National Institutes of Health, 
dementia is not a particular disease, but is rather the name for a collection of 
symptoms. 17 Those who have dementia suffer from "significantly impaired 
intellectual functioning." 18 Alzheimer's disease is one of the main factors 
leading to dementia and its most frequent cause. 19 
The hallmark of AD is "deposits of the protein fragment beta-amyloid 
(plaques) and twisted strands of the protein tau (tangles) as well as evidence 
of nerve cell damage and death in the brain.mo Alzheimer's disease is "a 
progressive, degenerative brain disease that slowly erodes memory and 
thinking skills, and eventually even the ability to carry out simple tasks.'m 
One significant fact about AD is that the impaired memory first affects "re-
cent events or newly learned information."22 According to the University of 
California San Francisco's Memory and Aging Center, "[a]s AD progresses, 
details or even the occurrence of recent events may be forgotten. Implicit 
(or memory for overlearned activities like riding a bike) and semantic 
memory (fact memory), as well as long-term memory, remain relatively 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. See infra CONCLUSION. 
16. ALZHEIMER'S ASS'N, supra note 5, at 5. 
17. NJNDS Dementia Information Page, NAT'L lNST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & 
STROKE, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/dementias/dementia.htm (last updated May 16, 
2012). 
18. Id. 
19. See The Difference Between Dementia and Alzheimer's, DEMENTIAGUIDE (Oct. 
11, 20 II), http://www.dementiaguide.com/community/dementia-articles/Difference _ Alzhei 
mer's and Dementia. 
20. ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, supra note 5, at 5. 
21. Alzheimer's Disease, UCSF MEMORY & AGING CENTER, 
http://memory.ucsf.edu/educationldiseases/alzheimer (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
22. Id.; see also Guy M. McKhann, Changing Concepts of Alzheimer Disease, 305 
JAMA 2458, 2458 (2011) ("[M]ost common form ... involves impairment of episodic 
memory such as the ability to learn and retain new information."). 
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intact early, but decline in these forms of memory eventually develops.'m 
As the disease continues to progress, distant memory worsens and language 
and visuospatial difficulties become prominent.24 For the purposes of the 
Rules of Evidence, it is also significant that symptoms in those with AD 
fluctuate, so that people have "good days" and "bad days."25 It is a progres-
sive disease, so "a person with early-stage AD may not show any symptoms 
one day; the next he or she may have trouble remembering your name or 
finding the milk in the refrigerator. m 6 
No studies have been conducted on the specific topic of AD and testi-
mony.27 However, there are seven stages of AD,Z8 which are instructive in 
determining whether testifying in a court of law will or may be problematic. 
The Alzheimer's Association specifies the following stages: 
I. "No impairment (normal function)" 
II. "Very mild cognitive decline (may be normal age-related changes or earliest 
signs of Alzheimer's disease)" 
III. "Mild cognitive decline (early-stage Alzheimer's can be diagnosed in some, 
but not all, individuals with these symptoms)" 
IV. "Moderate cognitive decline (Mild or early-stage Alzheimer's disease)" 
V. "Moderately severe cognitive decline (Moderate or mid-stage Alzheimer's 
disease)" 
VI. "Severe cognitive decline (Moderately severe or mid-stage Alzheimer's dis-
ease)" 
VII. "Very severe cognitive decline (Severe or late-stage Alzheimer's disease)"29 
As will be shown below, it is likely that witnesses in only stages five, 
six, and seven will cause evidentiary issues for courts. Stage seven, which is 
described as an individual losing the ability to respond to his or her envi-
23. Alzheimer's Disease, supra note 21 (footnotes omitted); see also Ludovico 
Minati et al., Current Concepts in Alzheimer's Disease: A Multidisciplinary Review, 24 AM. 
J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & OTHER DEMENTIAS 95, 100 (2009). 
24. Gardner, Coble Armstrong & Rashti, supra note 6, at 133, 141. Visuospatial is 
defined as "[o]f or relating to visual perception of spatial relationships among objects." THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE MEDICAL DICTIONARY 879 (2d ed. 2007). 
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 41; UNIV. OF S. CAL. 
L.A. CAREGIVER RES. CTR., FACT SHEET: ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 2 (2002), available at 
http:l/lacrc.usc.edu/forms/alzheimers%20disease.pdf. 
26. UNIV. OF S. CAL. L.A. CAREGIVER RES. CTR., supra note 25, at 2. 
27. Sal A. Soraci et al., Psychological Impairment, Eyewitness Testimony, and False 
Memories: Individual Differences, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY 
FOR EVENTS 261, 267-68 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007). 
28. Seven Stages of Alzheimer's, ALZHEIMER's Ass'N, https://www.alz.org/alzh 
eimers _disease_ stages_ of_ a1zheimers.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2013 ). 
29. /d. 
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ronment, carry on a conversation, and control movement,30 should ordinarily 
preclude the individual's ability to testify, although he or she may still be 
able to say words and phrases. Alzheimer's disease has no known cure or 
treatment, although the Food and Drug Administration has approved some 
medications that may temporarily alleviate symptoms.31 
II. COMPETENCY AS A WITNESS AND ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 
Live witness testimony is one type of evidence that is offered at trial. 
Trial evidence may be categorized into the following six areas: ( 1) oral tes-
timony, (2) real evidence, (3) documents, (4) demonstrative evidence, (5) 
stipulations, and (6) judicial notice.32 Oral testimony, which is most likely to 
be most affected by AD, may be further divided into (1) fact witnesses; (2) 
expert witnesses; and (3) character witnesses. 33 This Article focuses on fact 
witnesses who suffer from AD. 
Many years ago, senility was used as a basis for completely disquali-
fying a witness froni testifying.34 This and many other witness disqualifica-
tions eventually disappeared in favor of allowing witnesses to testify, with 
the jury weighing the credibility of that testimony.35 The Advisory Commit-
tee to the Rules of Evidence proposed changes to the Rules of Evidence in 
1972 and noted that "[ n ]o mental or moral qualifications for testifying as a 
witness are specified."36 When the Rules were adopted in 1975, a very broad 
provision on the competency of witnesses was passed, and the Rule now 
provides the following: "Every person is competent to be a witness unless 
these rules provide otherwise. But in a civil case, state law governs the wit-
ness's competency regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies 
the rule of decision. 'm 
30. /d. 
31. Sandra Day O'Connor, Stanley Prusiner & Ken Dychtwald, The Age of Alz-
heimer's, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/I0/28/opinion/ 
28oconnor.html?_r=O; see also ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, supra note 5, at 12. 
32. DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE 
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 7 -I 0 (2d ed. 20 12). 
33. /d. 
34. Thomas J. Feeney, Expert Psychological Testimony on Credibility Issues, 115 
MIL.L.REv.l21, 123(1987). 
35. !d.; see also FED. R. Evm. 601 advisory committee's note. 
36. FED. R. Evm. 601 advisory committee's note. 
37. FED. R. EVID. 601; Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1934 (1975). The second 
sentence was added primarily to account for particular states' Dead Man's Acts. FED. R. 
Evm. 601 advisory committee's note. Note the Rules provided throughout this Article are the 
Restyled Rules of Evidence, which became effective on December 1, 2011. See id. There-
styled changes to the Federal Rules "are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to 
change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility." FED. R. Evm. 601 (including the 
2011 amendment). 
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The Committee determined that courts had generally moved toward 
exercising discretion in favor of generally allowing testimony and leaving it 
to the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.38 In fact, the Advisory 
Committee went so far as to state that it is "difficult to imagine" a witness 
"wholly without capacity."39 
Prior to the modern-day rules, as early as 1882, the U.S. Supreme 
Court indicated the following as the "general rule": 
[A] lunatic or a person affected with insanity is admissible as a witness if he have 
[sic] sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath, and to be ca-
pable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in ref-
erence to the questions at issue; and whether he have [sic] that understanding is a 
question to be determined by the court, upon examination of the party himself, and 
any competent witnesses who can speak to the nature and extent of his insanity.40 
Because capacity to testify is a question of law, judges decide whether a 
particular witness is competent, with a presumption that witnesses are com-
petent.41 The question about believability is then left to the jury, which 
weighs the credibility oftestimony.42 
According to the Supreme Court, judges should consider the following 
two criteria: "(1) whether the proposed witness is capable of comprehending 
the nature of the oath, and (2) whether the witness is capable of giving an 
accurate account of what he or she has seen and heard."43 "The days are 
long past when any mental illness was presumed to undermine a witness's 
competence to testify."44 In a case involving the question of whether rest 
home residents (described as "persons of advanced years, feeble both physi-
cally and mentally") were competent to testify at a trial for election fraud, 
the Court quoted a "leading commentator" on evidence, stating the follow-
mg: 
"[T]he culmination of the modem trend which has converted questions of compe-
tency into questions of credibility while 'steadily moving towards a realization that 
38. FED. R. Evm. 601 advisory committee's note. 
39. !d. 
40. District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519,521-22 (1883) (citing Regina v. 
Hill, (1851) 5 Cox 259). 
41. United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., No. 88 Cr. 796 (CSH), 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13894, at *3, *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989); Kevin M. Cremin et al., Ensuring a 
Fair Hearing for Litigants with Mental Illnesses: The Law and Psychology of Capacity, 
Admissibility, and Credibility Assessments in Civil Proceedings, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 455, 460 
(2009). 
42. Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules 
and Evidence Combined, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2577,2584 (2007). 
43. Cremin et al., supra note 41, at 462 (citing Armes, 107 U.S. at 521-22). 
44. United States v. George, 532 F.3d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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judicial determination of the question of whether a witness should be heard at all 
should be abrogated in favor of hearing the testimony for what it is worth. "'45 
The Court went on to limit those disqualified to persons who are without 
personal knowledge, without the capacity to recall, or without the ability to 
understand the duty to testify truthfully.46 
Nevertheless, courts have in some instances precluded the testimony 
of a witness with AD or another form of dementia. The Superior Court of 
Delaware in In re Asbestos Litigation Carter Trial Group disallowed the 
deposition testimony of "an elderly gentleman whose memory [was] fuzzy 
and who, though clearly striving to recall details of his work over a forty-
year period ... [was] simply unable to do so with any degree of certainty ."47 
Oddly enough, the court still found that "Mr. Thomas knew right from 
wrong and that he understood his obligation to testify truthfully."48 In Aver-
ill v. Gleaner Life Insurance Society, District Court Judge Carr, when 
speaking about a potential witness, seemingly imposed a blanket rule and 
stated, "According to the defendant, he is elderly and afflicted with demen-
tia or Alzheimer's disease. If so, he is not competent to testify, even if he 
has relevant testimony to offer."49 In a case involving not a witness with 
AD, but the testimony of a child, Ninth Circuit Justice Noonan wrote in his 
dissenting opinion, "You cannot cross-examine an idiot, a victim of Alz-
heimer's, a baby--they cannot understand what they are supposed to do."50 
He further stated that "[t]he 'necessities of the case' do not create compe-
tency. If your chief witness is incompetent, you do not have a case."51 Judge 
Noonan's words were adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 
case in which the court perhaps incorrectly fused the differing concepts of 
competency and the constitutional right of confrontation. 52 
Conversely, other courts have allowed witnesses with AD to testify, or 
have held against a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when experts 
were not retained at the trial level to attempt to block testimony. In Monte-
verde v. Mitchell, District Court Judge Ware determined that a witness with 
AD had diminished abilities that were "obvious to the jury," and that there 
45. United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF 
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES§ 601 (1975)). 
46. !d. 
47. In re Asbestos Litig., No. 91C-07-61, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 488, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1992). 
48. !d. at *5. 
49. Averill v. Gleaner Life Ins. Soc'y, No. 3:06CV2867, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
105121, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2009). 
50. Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 1997) (Noonan, J., dis-
senting). 
51. !d. 
52. Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 702 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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was thus no need for the petitioner's attorney to secure the services of an 
expert in an attempt to exclude her testimony.53 In Banez v. Banez, the Court 
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a witness 
with "moderate severity" AD to testify, despite the fact that she "at times 
seemed confused."54 That court found that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion because the witness "demonstrated she was able to communicate 
and recollect her living apart from her husband due to her fear of him."55 In 
a Michigan Court of Appeals case, the court stated that though the witness 
(plaintiff) had not been officially diagnosed with AD, a diagnosis to that 
effect would not necessarily mean the plaintiff was incompetent to testify.56 
Finally, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided that a trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in allowing a plaintiff-appellant to testify despite her 
AD.57 In that case, the physician who treated the plaintiff-appellant testified 
that she "could typically recall remote things better than more recent 
events."58 
In an evidentiary hearing concerning an AD-diagnosed victim-
witness's competence to testify, Judge Stokes of the Superior Court of the 
State of Delaware noted instances of "substantial confusion" but ruled the 
witness was competent to testify.59 The judge cited to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence Advisory Committee Notes as well as to the "majority of states"60 
and stated that "[t]he jury will be able to assess whether or not they find Ms. 
Kilroy credible after hearing her testimony at trial."61 Judge Stokes cited to a 
Texas Court of Civil Appeals case in which the court affirmed a conviction 
where the prosecution relied upon testimony from a witness-victim who 
was diagnosed with AD.62 In that case, the victim-witness testified initially 
that she was injured by "'a pistol sticking right in [her] face,"' although the 
53. Monteverde v. Mitchell, No. C 09-407 JW (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124957, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010). 
54. Banez v. Banez, 2007-0hio-4584, '1!'1!15, 178. 
55. !d. '1!178. 
56. Romig v. Norfolk S. Ry., No. 297040, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 1257, at *5 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 7, 2011) (exemplifying where there was testimony from another witness 
that the plaintiff suffered from AD). 
57. Fugent v. Whitehall Inn, Inc., No. 703 Pittsburgh 1986, 1987 Pa. Super. LEXIS 
9922, at *6-7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1987). 
58. !d. at *6. 
59. State v. Baker, No. 0302013230, 2003 WL 21999596, at *I, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/delaware/superior-
court/38130-0.pdf(exemplif)'ing where the victim/witness was unable to remember the year 
she was born, her religion, the number of siblings she had, and the current day of the week, 
month, or season, among other things). 
60. /d. at *2-3. The cases cited were not all AD cases. See id. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. (citing Rodriguez v. State, 772 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tex. App. 1989)). 
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attack had in fact been made with a knife.63 Although the court acknowl-
edged that parts of her testimony "taken out of ... context ... raise[ d] trou-
bling questions," it also determined that she was "sufficiently coherent and 
intelligible. "64 
Given the information on the progressive nature of AD and the re-
quirements of Rule 601 (particularly considering the Advisory Committee 
Notes to the Rule), most individuals with AD should be allowed to testify in 
court. If the issue concerns newly acquired information65 or the potential 
witness is having a particularly difficult day, the court may wish to recon-
sider allowing the witness to testify.66 These issues will be addressed below. 
Ill. HEARSAY, UNAVAILABILITY, AND A WITNESS WITH ALZHEIMER'S 
DISEASE 
The next area in the Rules of Evidence that may be affected when an 
individual has AD is the second set of exceptions to the hearsay rule, Rule 
804, specifically the following provisions of the rule: 
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-When the Declarant Is Una-
vailable as a Witness 
(a) CRITERIA FOR BEING UNAVAILABLE. A declarant is considered to be unavailable 
as a witness if the declarant: 
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter, 
(4) cannot be present or testifY at the trial or hearing because of death or a 
then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness67 
63. Rodriguez, 772 S.W.2d at 171. 
64. /d. at 170. Interestingly, the Court cited to the earlier Texas case of Watson v. 
State, a case that seems to have a rather high bar for competency. 596 S.W.2d 867, 870-71 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("If a person afflicted with a physical or mental disability possesses 
sufficient intelligence to receive correct impressions of events he sees, retains clear recollec-
tion of them and is able to communicate them through some means, there is no reason for 
rejecting his testimony." (first emphasis added)). 
65. This phenomenon is referred to as "first in, last out and last in, first out." See 
Carole B. Larkin, How the Loss of Memory Works in Alzheimer's Disease, and How Under-
standing This Could Help You, ALZHEIMER'S READING ROOM (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www .alzheimersreadingroom.com/20 11/0 1 /how-loss-of-memory-works-in-
alzheimers.html. 
66. What Is Alzheimer's Disease?, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/memory/ 
understand/alzheimers.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) ("Memory loss for recently acquired 
information is common but older information remains perfectly intact. In the later stages, 
sufferers can retreat into their childhood, replacing the people and context of the present, 
with those of the past."). 
67. FED. R. EVID. 804 (emphasis added); Pub. L. No. 93-595, § I, 88 Stat. 1934 
(1975). 
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The unavailability provisions are of course a prerequisite to using the 
actual hearsay exception rules of Rule 804(b ). Prior to passage of the rule, 
the lack of memory was generally recognized by courts as unavailability, 
although there was some concern within the Advisory Committee about a 
particular witness's feigned lack of memory. 68 The witness need not actually 
be "unavailable"-the issue is whether the testimony is unavailable.69 Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 804, "unavailability" includes situations in 
which the declarant testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his 
statement. "The crucial factor is not the unavailability of the witness but 
rather the unavailability of his [or her] testimony."70 As discussed more ful-
ly below, courts have found that "there is a critical distinction between una-
vailability for confrontation clause purposes and unavailability for eviden-
tiary purposes."71 
A party need not establish a total memory loss for a finding of "una-
vailability" of a witness's testimony under the hearsay rule.72 Accordingly, 
full cognitive decline is not necessary for this provision to apply. Patients 
with mild AD "generally show a short-term memory deficit," followed by a 
"worsening of the memory impairment as atrophic changes progress in the 
hippocampal structures."73 The progression rate for those with AD varies 
widely.74 One study found that "[c]linical experience with this population 
indicates that significant emotional experiences may be salient to people 
with dementia, and that certain behaviors and characteristics enhance their 
credibility as historians.ms 
68. FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(3) advisory committee's note. When enacted, the Commit-
tee rejected any change to existing federal law on the lack of memory and indicated that a 
court could simply choose to disbelieve a declarant's testimony about his or her loss of 
memory.ld.; see also State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201,204-05 (Minn. 2003). 
69. Walden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 654 F.2d 443,446 (5th Cir. 1981). 
70. !d. (citing 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 45, § 804(a)). 
71. See, e.g., State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 872 (Wash. 2011) (emphasis added). 
72. State v. Schiappa, 728 A.2d 466, 474 (Conn. 1999) ("[P]artial memory loss 
reasonably may provide the basis for a finding of unavailability." (citing 2 McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE§ 253, at 133 (Kenneth S. Browned., 5th ed. 1999))). 
73. Roberta Perri et al., Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment: Difference of Memory 
Profile in Subjects Who Converted or Did Not Convert to Alzheimer's Disease, 21 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 549, 556 (2007) (citing Arturo Orsini et al., Immediate Memory Spans in 
Dimentia, 67 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 267 (1988); N.C. Fox et al., Presymptomatic 
Hippocampal Atrophy in Alzheimer's Disease: A Longitudinal MRl Study, 119 BRAIN 2001 
(1996)). 
74. Alzheimer's Stages: How the Disease Progresses, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www .mayoclinic.comlhealth/alzheimers-stages/ AZ00041. 
75. AILEEN WIGLESWORTH & LAURA MOSQUEDA, PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA AS 
WITNESSES TO EMOTIONAL EVENTS (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ 
nijlgrants/234132.pdf. 
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There is a lack of research on elderly eyewitnesses and testimony from 
elderly persons in generaJ.16 There are currently disagreements amongst 
experts about the reliability of elderly witnesses.77 According to one study 
conducted in 1994, "Patients with probable Alzheimer's disease (AD) not 
only fail to retrieve desired information but also suffer from distortions of 
memory."78 On the other hand, in a study published in 2002 that compared 
prior findings, the authors stated, "The literature to date has been mixed 
with regard to whether AD patients show impaired or preserved emotional-
memory enhancement effects.m9 In one study, elderly witnesses were per-
ceived by mock jurors as being more trustworthy, yet less reliable.8° Con-
versely, in another study, the authors found that although there was a "nega-
tive age bias against elderly witnesses," the data suggested an actual bias in 
favor of the testimony of elderly witnesses.81 Experiments have even shown 
that elderly believability by the jury depends upon multiple factors, such as 
the actual age of the elderly person, whether they are male or female, and 
the amount of time the mock jurors spent with the elderly personsY Un-
doubtedly, given the aging of society, there will be an increasing number of 
elderly witnesses, including those with AD. In fact, because of the "slow-
motion train wreck" that is AD,83 courts will have increasing opportunities 
to deal with this subject in the years ahead.84 By the age of eighty-five, those 
76. Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the 
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REv. 435, 499 n.309 
(2009); Rowena Jones & Tony Elliott, Capacity to Give Evidence in Court: Issues That May 
Arise When a Client with Dementia Is a Victim of Crime, 29 PSYCHIATRIST 324, 324-26 
(2005) (surveying Great Britain, Australia, and the United States); see also Brian H. Bom-
stein, Memory Processes in Elderly Eyewitnesses: What We Know and What We Don't 
Know, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 337, 345 (1995). 
77. L. Beth Gaydon & Monica K. Miller, Elders in the Justice System: How the 
System Treats Elders in Trials, During Imprisonment, and on Death Row, 25 BEHA v. SCI. & 
L. 677, 679-80 (2007). 
78. Andrew E. Budson et al., Semantic Versus Phonological False Recognition in 
Aging and Alzheimer's Disease, 51 BRAIN & COGNITION 251, 251 (2003). 
79. Elizabeth A. Kensinger et al., Effects of Normal Aging and Alzheimer's Disease 
on Emotional Memory, 2 EMOTION 118, 130 (2002) (citations omitted). 
80. Bomstein, supra note 76, at 338. 
81. Narina Nunez et al., The Testimony of Elderly Victim/Witnesses and Their Im-
pact on Juror Decisions: The Importance of Examining Multiple Stereotypes, 23 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 413,414 (1999). 
82. Katrin Mueller-Johnson et al., The Perceived Credibility of Older Adults as 
Witnesses and Its Relation to Ageism, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 355, 372 (2007). 
83. George Bartzokis, Baby Boomers and Alzheimer's Disease, ABC NEWS (July 18, 
20 II), http:/ /abcnews.go.com!Health/ Alzheimers/baby-boomers-alzheimers-disease/story?id 
=14084404. 
84. Mueller-Johnson et al., supra note 82, at 373 ("Given the pervasiveness of ageist 
attitudes in society, this finding, if replicated, can have important implications for legal pro-
ceedings: with the ratio of older persons in the population steadily growing and projected to 
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The New York Times refers to as the "old-old," one-half of Americans will 
have AD,85 and courts will consequently need to determine unavailability 
not only under the hearsay rule, but under the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment as well. 
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE AGE OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 
A. The Confrontation Clause--In General 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him."86 Between the years 1980 and 2004, 
the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was rather static.87 In 1980, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ohio v. Roberts and held that the admis-
sion of an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable witness did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment, provided it had "adequate 'indicia of reliabil-
ity. "'88 There were two ways to establish these indicia of reliability, accord-
ing to the Court: if the out-of-court statement either fell within a "firmly 
rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness," then the admission of the statement met the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause.89 In 2004, the defendant in Crawfordv. Washington asked 
the Supreme Court to reconsider the Roberts interpretation and argued that 
the "test strays from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause."90 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, agreed.91 In Crawford, the Court 
performed a lengthy review of the history of the right to confront one's ac-
cusers, beginning with Roman times.92 Two "inferences" were drawn from 
an examination of this history.93 The first was that the "principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed" was the "use of ex parte ex-
aminations as evidence against the accused."94 The second was that not all 
out-of-court statements fall under the Sixth Amendment's "core concems."95 
reach I :5 in the USA by 2050, more older persons will be involved in legal cases." (citations 
omitted)). 
85. See Thomas L. Friedman, Coming Soon: The Big Trade-Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 
28, 2012, at I SR; Bartzokis, supra note 83. 
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
87. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 
756 (2005). 
88. 448 u.s. 56, 66 (1980). 
89. /d. 
90. 541 u.s. 36,42 (2004). 
91. /d. at 68. 
92. /d. at 43. 
93. /d. at 50. 
94. /d. 
95. /d. at 51. 
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With Crawford, the Supreme Court radically transformed the interpre-
tation of the Confrontation Clause.96 This led to a "steady stream" of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions since 2004 applying its holding in Crawford.91 
This "fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right" is the 
following: '"Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [can be] 
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the de-
fendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. "'98 
The steady stream of cases was brought because the Supreme Court 
decided against specifically defining the term "testimonial statements."99 
However, the Court did hint at the meaning of the term, stating that "at a 
minimum," prior testimony at a preliminary hearing and grand jury testimo-
ny, as well as testimony at a former trial, were considered testimonial. 100 
Also included in the term were "pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" and extrajudicial statements, 
including "formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions."101 On the other hand, an "off-hand, over-
heard remark" would not be testimonial, nor would business records, public 
records, or statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. 102 
In the Davis v. Washington 103 and Michigan v. Bryant104 cases, the 
Court considered out-of-court statements made to the police. In Davis, 
Michelle McCottry called 911, but the call abruptly ended. 105 The 911 op-
erator called back, spoke with her, and asked, "What's going on?'' 106 
McCottry answered, "He's here jumpin' on me again," "He's usin' his 
fists," and "He's runnin' now."107 McCottry failed to appear at trial, and the 
State of Washington introduced the 911 tape, over Davis's objection. 108 In 
the companion case, Hammon, the police responded to a reported domestic 
96. Dylan 0. Keenan, Note, Bullcoming and Cold Cases: Reconciling the Confron-
tation Clause with DNA Evidence, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER ALIA 13, 13 (2012). 
97. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012) (referencing Davis v. Wash-
ington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), which was decided with Hammon v. Indiana; Indiana v. Ed-
wards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); and Bull-
coming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)). 
98. !d. (alterations in original) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59). 
99. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."'). 
100. !d. 
101. !d. at 51-52. 
102. !d. at 51, 56; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. 
103. 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (including Hammon v. Indiana as a companion case). 
104. 131 S.Ct.1143, 1150(2011). 
105. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
106. !d. 
107. /d. at 817-18. 
108. /d. at 819. 
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incident and found Amy Hammon alone, outside the house on her front 
porch. 109 She indicated that nothing was wrong, and her husband Hershel, 
who was in the kitchen, told the officers that there had been an argument, 
but no violence occurred. 110 The officers eventually spoke again with Amy 
and, based upon her account of the incident, had her fill out and sign an 
affidavit. 111 As McCottry had done, Amy did not appear at trial and the of-
ficer authenticated and testified about the affidavit, over Hershel's objec-
tion.112 Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority, stated the following: 
Statements are non testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation un-
der circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interroga-
tion is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testi-
monial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 113 
The Court revisited this "ongoing emergency" situation in Michigan v. 
Bryant. 114 In that case, Anthony Covington had been shot in the abdomen 
and was bleeding extensively and in great pain when approached by the 
responding police officers. 115 He was questioned by police for five to ten 
minutes and made numerous statements before the emergency medical ser-
vices arrived. 116 The Supreme Court, with Justice Sotomayor writing for the 
majority, decided that the statements Covington made were not testimonial 
because the primary purpose of the police questions and his answers, 
viewed objectively, was to respond to an ongoing emergency. 117 The Court 
indicated that this is a "highly context-dependent inquiry."118 Although Jus-
tice Scalia, in his dissent, disagreed vehemently, the majority found there 
was a potential threat to the public at large. 119 
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
111. /d. at 820. 
112. !d. 
113. !d. at 822. 
114. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
115. /d.atll50. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. Covington subsequently died from the gunshot wound. !d. 
118. /d. at 1158. 
119. !d. at 1156. Justice Scalia wrote the following in his dissenting opinion: 
Today's tale--a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dy-
ing man with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony 
regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a murderer 
somewhere on the loose--is so transparently false that professing to believe it de-
means this institution .... [T]oday's opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence and leaves it in a shambles. 
!d. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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In three post-Crawford cases, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of lab reports and whether and under what circumstances these are testimo-
nial. The first case was Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, which involved 
three forensic "certificates of analysis" indicating that the substance found 
in a police cruiser was in fact cocaine. 120 The Court found the certificates to 
be indistinguishable from affidavits, which were clearly testimonial, accord-
ing to Crawford. 121 The evidence, submitted without a witness, was "func-
tionally identical to live, in-court testimony."122 Cross-examination is neces-
sary because "[ c ]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudu-
lent analyst, but the incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been 
found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials."123 Justice Thomas 
cast the deciding vote, as he voted with the majority, but wrote a short con-
curring opinion. 124 He wrote the following: "' [T]he Confrontation Clause is 
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testi-
mony, or confessions,"' and he agreed these were "'quite plainly'" affida-
vits.125 His view, reiterating his stance in Giles v. California, 126 becomes 
important for Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, as will be shown below. 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico was the next forensic report case decided 
by the Supreme Court involving the Confrontation Clause. 127 The Court 
answered a question that had been looming since Melendez-Diaz. 128 In Bull-
coming, a New Mexico Department of Health Scientific Laboratory Divi-
sion analyst, Gerasimos Razatos, testified about Donald Bullcoming's "Re-
port of Blood Alcohol Analysis" that had been written by another analyst, 
Curtis Caylor. 129 Razatos had neither participated in nor reviewed Caylor's 
work. 130 In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that the "surrogate testimony" did 
not meet constitutional requirements, and that the actual author of the report 
was necessary .131 The Court did not answer several lingering questions that 
120. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009). 
121. /d. at 310. 
122. /d. at 310-11. 
123. /d.at319. 
124. !d. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
125. !d. at 329-30 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
126. 554 U.S. 353, 378 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
127. 131 S. Ct. 2705,2712-13 (2011). 
128. !d. 
129. /d. at 2709-10. Interestingly, for reasons not disclosed, Caylor had been put on 
unpaid leave just prior to the trial. /d. at 2711-12. 
130. !d. at 2712. 
131. !d. at 2710. 
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were not relevant to its decision. 132 One issue, of course, was how prosecu-
tors would handle cases in which the author of the report was not available 
(such as in "cold case" DNA cases). 133 Commentators saw calling an expert 
to testify about the results of the forensic reports as a possible solution. 134 
The Bullcoming case set the stage for the next and most recent Su-
preme Court case on the Confrontation Clause, Williams v. Illinois. 135 In 
February 2000, a young woman (L.J.) was abducted and raped in Chica-
go. 136 She was treated at a hospital, where the personnel took a vaginal swab 
from her using a sexual-assault kit. 137 The Illinois State Police sent the swab 
to a Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory for DNA testing. 138 Cellmark sent 
back a report "signed by two 'reviewers"' stating that the swab contained 
DNA from a male "donor."139 At the time of the testing, there were no rape 
suspects in the case. 140 The defendant, Sandy Williams, was arrested later 
for an unrelated crime, his DNA was tested, and the results were entered 
into the Illinois State Police (ISP) database. 141 An ISP forensic specialist, 
Sandra Lambatos, "conducted a computer search to see if the Cellmark 
[DNA] profile matched any" profiles within the ISP database, and a match 
to the defendant was discovered. 142 Lambatos was the person who testified 
at trial to link the defendant to the Cellmark finding. 143 
The earlier Bullcoming decision left the question open as to whether 
an expert could serve as this forensic "link."144 On June 18, 2012, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued a fractured decision, holding that there was in fact no 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 145 Unfortunately, 
"no single rationale for the decision in Williams commanded a majority of 
132. Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: 
How the Supreme Court Could Have UsedBullcoming v. New Mexico to Clarify Confronta-
tion Clause Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REv. 502, 558 (2011). 
133. Keenan, supra note 96, at 19-21. 
134. !d. at 21-23. 
135. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
136. /d. at 2229. 
137. /d. 
138. /d. 
139. /d. at 2229; /d. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
140. /d. at 2228 (majority opinion). 
141. !d. at2229. 
142. !d. 
143. !d. at 2229-30. 
144. See Jeffrey Fisher, The Holdings and Implications of Williams v. Illinois, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2012, 2:20PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-holdings-
and-implications-of-williams-v-illinois. 
145. See John Castellano, Castellano on Williams v. Illinois: Fractured Supreme 
Court Approves Introduction Under Confrontation Clause of Expert Testimony Relying on 
Others' DNA Reports, 2012 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 6559. 
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the Court."146 Four Justices (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer) believed 
that there was no Confrontation Clause violation for the following reasons: 
1. The Cellmark DNA test report (lodged, but never offered in evidence), relied 
upon by the expert from the State of Illinois was not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted and thus did not fit within the Crawford analysis and consequently 
did not violate the 6th Amendment; and 
2. "Even if the Cellmark report had been introduced for its truth .... [it] was not 
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual" and thus did 
not violate the 6th Amendment. 147 
Justice Thomas concurred in result only. 148 He did not agree with ei-
ther of the above rationales, but rather found that the Cellmark report was 
not testimonial and the Crawford analysis was not triggered at all. 149 He 
believed that the report "lack[ ed] the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition, 
for it [was] neither a sworn nor a certified declaration offact."150 
Four justices dissented, and Justice Kagan wrote a lengthy dissenting 
opinion (joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor). 151 She be-
lieved that under Confrontation Clause precedent (most notably the Melen-
dez-Diaz and Bullcoming cases), Williams was "an open-and-shut case."152 
Justice Kagan began her dissent in an interesting way-with a reference to a 
State of California case in which a Cellmark analyst, when undergoing cross 
examination, realized that she had "made a mortifying error."153 The dissent 
went on to point out that "[f]ive Justices specifically reject every aspect of 
[the plurality's] reasoning and every paragraph of its explication."154 Justice 
Kagan indicated that the State of Illinois used Lambatos as a mere conduit 
for the Cellmark report and that in the future, states will "sneak in" the evi-
dence through the back door. 155 She specifically stated that "Lambatos 's 
testimony is functionally identical to the 'surrogate testimony' that New 
Mexico proffered in Bullcoming, which did nothing to cure the problem 
identified in Melendez-Diaz." 156 In fact, she stated that the first rationale 
relied upon by the plurality opinion "endorses a prosecutorial dodge," and 
146. !d. 
147. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227-28, 2242-44. 
148. /d. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
149. /d. at 2255-56, 2259-60. 
150. !d. at 2260. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion as well. ld. at 2244 (Brey-
er, J., concurring). He would have had the case reargued, as he would like an answer to the 
question, "What, if any, are the outer limits of the 'testimonial statements' rule set forth in 
Crawford." /d. at 2244-45. 
151. !d. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
152. !d. at 2265-67. 
153. !d. at 2264. 
154. !d. at 2265. 
155. /d. at 2272. 
156. !d. at 2267 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011)). 
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the second rationale "relies on distinguishing indistinguishable forensic 
reports." 157 The dissenting Justices' analysis certainly appears to be correct, 
as "[t]he incriminating trial testimony came ... from a 'state-employed sci-
entist' who had no relationship whatsoever with the contents of the re-
port."lss 
On the other hand, an expert in this area believes that due to Justice 
Thomas's concurrence in the result only, the fracturing is really along the 
lines of the type of forensic report. 159 He theorizes that reports on the analy-
sis of drugs, blood, alcohol, fingerprints, ballistics, and autopsies will con-
tinue to be governed by the Me/endez-Diaz/Bullcoming analysis. 160 On the 
other hand, "statements made as part of a lab's internal work product or in a 
subsidiary report used to generate a final incriminating report will generally 
not be testimonial."161 
It is clear that there are no longer any clear demarcations in certain ar-
eas that may or may not implicate the Confrontation Clause. One commen-
tator describes the four separate opinions in the Williams case as displaying 
the dysfunctional nature of the Justices in this particular constitutional ar-
ea. 162 Another posits that there is "much uncertainty in terms of the proper 
application of the Confrontation Clause now and in the future."163 
One remaining important area in post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence is the applicability of "forfeiture by wrongdoing."164 There 
were two exceptions to the Confrontation Clause under common law: first, 
if the individual made the statements while on the "brink of death," and 
second, if the speaker was prevented from appearing because he or she "was 
'detained' or 'kept away' by the 'means or procurement' of the defend-
ant."165 This second exception became known as forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court addressed this issue for the first 
time after their Crawford decision. 166 Brenda A vie was shot and killed by 
Dwayne Giles, and the State sought to admit statements made by A vie to 
157. !d. at 2265. 
158. Andrew Cohen, The Supreme Court Splinters Apart over the Confrontation 
Clause, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/20 12/06/the-
supreme-court-splinters-apart-over-the-confrontation-clause/258634 (quoting Williams, 132 
S. Ct. at 2267). 
159. Fisher, supra note 144. Professor Fisher was the lead counsel for the petitioners 
in Crawford, Davis, Melendez-Diaz, and Bul/coming. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 37 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 816 (2006); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009); Bul/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709. 
160. Fisher, supra note 144. 
161. !d. 
162. Cohen, supra note 158. 
163. Castellano, supra note 145. 
164. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008). 
165. !d. at 358-59. 
166. See id. at 358. 
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police officers three weeks before the shooting. 167 The State conceded that 
the statements were testimonial, but argued that Giles waived his right to 
confrontation because he killed A vie. 168 Justice Scalia, once again looking 
back in history for the answer, wrote the majority opinion and held that in 
order for the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to apply, the defendant must 
have made the witness unavailable for the purpose of preventing testimo-
ny.169 The Court stated the following: 
The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony 
would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a 
witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant 
had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from 
testifying-as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the 
victim-the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dy-
ing-declaration exception. 170 
Interestingly, Justice Thomas believed that even in this situation, the an-
swers A vie provided to the officers were not testimonial, as the police ques-
tioning was not '"a formalized dialogue. "'171 Nevertheless, because the State 
did not make any argument that the statements were non-testimonial, he 
concurred in the judgment. 172 
In the eight years since the Crawford decision, the Court has provided 
a significant amount of guidance. For example, it is now clear that state-
ments in reply to police questions will be considered "testimonial" unless 
there is an ongoing emergency, although the Justices disagree as to what 
exactly constitutes an ongoing emergency. 173 Additionally, for forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, the prosecution must show that the defendant made the declar-
ant unavailable for the narrow purpose of testifying and not for any other 
purpose. 174 Other areas are not clear, particularly in the area of forensic re-
ports.175 It remains to be decided under what circumstances expert witnesses 
will be allowed to testify about the findings of non-testifying analysts. 
167. /d. at 356. 
168. /d. at 358. 
169. /d. at 355, 361. 
170. /d. at 361-62. 
171. /d. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
172. !d. at 377-78. 
173. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
174. Giles, 554 U.S. at 359-62. 
175. Castellano, supra note 145; Fisher, supra note 144. 
1264 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1245 
B. The Meaning of "Unavailable"-Hearsay Versus the Confrontation 
Clause 
Is it possible for a patient with Alzheimer's disease to be considered 
unavailable for purposes of the hearsay exceptions under Rule 804 and nev-
ertheless be considered available for cross-examination purposes under the 
Confrontation Clause? Certain courts have answered that question affirma-
tively, relying upon both case law decided prior to Crawford and the Craw-
ford case itself. 176 
The U.S. Supreme Court considered this issue, but did not answer the 
question squarely, in United States v. Owens, decided in 1988. 177 In Owens, 
Foster, an employee of a correctional institution, was attacked in a federal 
prison by a person wielding a metal pipe. 178 He suffered a fractured skull, 
and his memory was "severely impaired."179 Mansfield, an FBI investigator, 
visited Foster in the hospital, and despite Foster's inability to remember his 
attacker's name on Mansfield's first visit, Foster named Owens on a subse-
quent visit and also identified him from a photo array. 18° Foster was called 
as a witness at trial, and he remembered his activities just prior to the attack, 
feeling the blows to his skull and seeing blood. 181 He did not, however, re-
call seeing Owens, although he testified that he did recall identifying him 
while he was in the hospital speaking with Mansfield. 182 
In the lower courts and before the Supreme Court, Owens objected to 
Foster's identification under both hearsay Rule 802 and the Confrontation 
Clause. 183 Justice Scalia corrected Owens' objection in footnote 1 of the 
opinion, and indicated that he should have raised his objection under Rule 
80l(d)(l)(C), not 802. 184 Justice Scalia continued the analysis on that basis. 
He indicated that the precise question ("a Confrontation Clause violation ... 
[based] upon a witness' loss of memory") had not yet been before the Court, 
but he cited California v. Green 185 and Delaware v. Fensterer186 as leaving 
176. See, e.g., State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 872-73 (Wash. 2011); In re M.H.V.-P., 
341 S.W.3d 553, 557-58 (Tex. App. 2011 ); State v. Delos Santos, 238 P.3d 162, 164, 177-81 
(Haw. 2010). 
177. 484 u.s. 554 (1988). 
178. /d. at 556; id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
179. !d. at 556 (majority opinion). 
180. !d. 
181. /d. 
182. !d. 
183. !d. at 556-57 & n.l. 
184. !d. at 557 n.l. 
185. 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970) ("Whether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so 
affected Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the application of 
the Confrontation Clause in this case is an issue which is not ripe for decision at this junc-
ture." (footnote omitted)). 
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the possibility open. 187 The Court, upon considering the question, stated the 
following: 
"[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-
ever extent, the defense might wish."' ... It is sufficient that the defendant has the 
opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and at-
tentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-
examination ... the very fact that he has a bad memory. 18 
Owens was decided using the old Roberts test. 189 The majority stated that 
"[o]rdinarily a witness is regarded as 'subject to cross-examination' when 
he [or she] is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to 
questions."190 Whether this remains the standard after Crawford is consid-
ered below. 
One of the significant findings in Owens is that there was no "internal 
inconsistency" between a witness being deemed unavailable for purposes of 
one hearsay rule yet available under another hearsay rule. 191 The first hear-
say rule discussed was 801(d)(l)(C), prior statements by a witness, and the 
second was 804(a)(3), defmition of unavailability--lack of memory. 192 It 
was necessary for Foster to be "'subject to cross-examination"' for the 
United States to be able to use his prior identification of Owens. 193 On the 
other hand, based upon his memory loss, Owens claimed that Foster would 
be deemed "unavailable" under Rule 804 and the United States could not 
have it both ways. 194 The Court disagreed. 195 The majority stated the follow-
ing with respect to the two hearsay rules: 
[Defendant] argues that this reading is impermissible because it creates an internal 
inconsistency in the Rules, since the forgetful witness who is deemed "subject to 
cross-examination" under 801 ( d)(I )(C) is simultaneously deemed "unavailable" 
under 804(a)(3) .... It seems to us, however, that this is not a substantive incon-
sistency, but only a semantic oddity resulting from the fact that Rule 804(a) has for 
convenience of reference in Rule 804(b) chosen to describe the circumstances nee-
186. At least two commentators believe the majority's reliance on the Fensterer case 
was misplaced. See David Greenwald, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 167, 178-79 
(1993); Claire L. Seltz, Sixth Amendment-The Confrontation Clause, Witness Memory Loss 
and Hearsay Exceptions: What Are the Defendant's Constitutional and Evidentiary Guaran-
tees-Procedure or Substance?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 866, 885-90 (I 988). 
187. Owens, 484 U.S. at 557-58. 
188. !d. at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 
739 (I 987)). 
189. See id. at 560. 
190. !d. at 561. 
191. !d. at 563-64. 
192. Seeid. 
193. !d. at 561-62 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(I)). 
194. !d. at 563. 
195. !d. at 564. 
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essary in order to admit certain categories of hearsay testimony under the rubric 
"Unavailability as a witness."196 
The majority also determined in a different part of its opinion that Fos-
ter was indeed available for cross-examination under the Confrontation 
Clause, despite his memory loss. 197 Although the Court did not squarely 
address Rule 804 versus the Confrontation Clause, it appears the Court 
would have reached a similar finding as it had when it analyzed Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) and the Confrontation Clause. It determined that the "unavail-
able" language in Rule 804 was merely a "semantic inconsistency" when 
compared with the language in 801(d)(l)(C), and it also found that Foster's 
testimony was admissible under both Rule 801(d)(1)(C) and the Confronta-
tion Clause. 198 
The dissenting justices, Brennan and Marshall, believed former Su-
preme Court jurisprudence required the opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not simply a hollow procedural formalism as was proposed by 
the majority. 199 They viewed the opportunity for effective cross-examination 
with an emphasis on the word effective, rather than the majority view, which 
put the emphasis on the word opportunity.200 Justices Brennan and Marshall 
cited Weinstein's Evidence treatise and agreed with Weinstein and Berger 
that endorsing the construction of Hearsay Rule 801(d)(l)(C) as the majori-
ty had done "render[ ed] it unconstitutional under the Confrontation 
Clause."201 In their opinion, the mere presence of a witness in the courtroom 
was not enough.202 
C. Does Owens Survive Crawforcf? 
The sea change in Confrontation Clause analysis caused by Crawford 
raises the issue of whether the Supreme Court would now view a witness 
suffering from memory loss any differently than it did in the Owens case. It 
must be noted that the Owens case did not involve a witness with complete 
memory loss, as Foster testified that he remembered telling FBI Agent 
Mansfield that Owens was his attacker; in fact, he described his memory of 
the day in the hospital when he made the identification as "vivid."203 He 
recollected making the identification but did not remember the actual at-
196. /d. at 563 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l), 804). For a critical view of this 
analysis, see Seltz, supra note 186, at 894-95 ("However, the Court did not give any support 
for this interpretation."). 
197. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559-60. 
198. See id. at 557 n.1, 563-64. 
199. /d. at 567, 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
200. /d. at 567-69, 571. 
201. /d. at 571 n.2. 
202. /d. at 572. 
203. /d. at 556 (majority opinion); id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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tack.204 That is, of course, markedly different from a situation when a wit-
ness has no recollection of any of the events at issue. Nevertheless, some 
courts have interpreted Owens in a way that allows prior out-of-court state-
ments, even when the witness has no memory of making the previous out-
of-court statement. 
The Colorado Supreme Court "held that prior statements made to a 
police investigator could be admitted even if the witness did not remember 
making them .... These principles have been followed in subsequent deci-
sions as well. "205 This case, although decided prior to Crawford, was subse-
quently relied upon in a case decided after Crawford.206 In Mercer v. United 
States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that nothing in 
the Crawford case indicated a change in reasoning from the Owens case. 207 
However, the Court misread Owens. The Court stated, "In Owens, a witness 
who had given a prior identification of an individual was not able to recall 
making that prior identification when called at trial due to memory loss."208 
As has been stated above, Foster remembered making the prior identifica-
tion to Agent Mansfield; it was the actual assault he did not recalt2°9 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii also misinterpreted the Supreme Court 
cases in stating the following without citing to any authority: "The Supreme 
Court's construction of the federal confrontation clause indicates that a wit-
ness who forgets both the underlying events and her prior statements none-
theless appears for cross-examination at trial."210 One wonders how such a 
witness would be allowed to testify at all, because according to this state-
ment, the witness could not possibly meet the personal knowledge require-
ment that is required of all witnesses. The Hawaii Supreme Court, in anoth-
er part of its opinion, cited to other state cases "applying Crawford [that] 
have held that a testifying witness appears for cross-examination at trial 
despite a nearly total lapse in memory.m'' 
The Court of Appeals of Texas has held similarly. In In re MH V. -P., 
the court stated that "memory loss does not render a witness 'absent' for 
204. See id. at 556 (majority opinion); id. at 566 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
205. People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1017 (Colo. 2004) (citing People 
v. Pepper, 568 P.2d 446, 447-48 (Colo. 1977); Owens, 484 U.S. at 560). 
206. !d. 
207. 864 A.2d 110, 114 n.4 (D.C. 2004). 
208. !d. 
209. Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 ("He testified that he clearly remembered identifying 
respondent as his assailant during his May 5th interview with Mansfield. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his assailant."); id. at 566 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
210. State v. Delos Santos, 238 P.3d 162, 177 (Haw. 2010). 
211. !d. at 179-80 (citing State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 566-68 (Minn. 2008); 
Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203,210-12 (Wyo. 2008); Mercer, 864 A.2d at 113, 114 n.4; People 
v. Perez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 526 (Ct. App. 2000); United States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 
302 (7th Cir. 1997); State v. Legere, 958 A.2d 969, 978 (N.H. 2008)). 
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Confrontation Clause purposes post-Crawford so long as the witness was 
present and testifying at the time the prior statement is admitted."212 In the 
same manner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces took the 
same route, and stated the following: "The Supreme Court's later decision 
in Crawford v. Washington is consistent with the Owens holding. In Craw-
ford, the Supreme Court reiterated that 'when the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraint[s] 
at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. "'213 These courts appear 
to take the view that provided there is a living breathing human on the 
stand, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause are met. It is difficult to 
square this position with the Crawford case when read in its entirety. 
Certainly, as one commentator has observed, "'[c]onfront' means 
something more, or at least something other, than 'look at."'214 As pointed 
out by the Seventh Circuit in Cookson v. Schwartz, the wording "'appears 
for cross-examination"' is not dispositive.215 In Cookson, the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied upon Justice Scalia's words that the "'Clause does not bar admis-
sion of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or 
explain it. "'216 The court cited to an earlier case it decided in which it deter-
mined that total amnesia with respect to a prior statement will often make a 
witness "'not subject to cross-examination' for Confrontation Clause pur-
poses."217 The court additionally cited to an Eighth Circuit case in which 
that court held that a "child's mere physical presence on the witness stand 
will not satisfy the Confrontation Clause's availability requirement."218 
If one reads Crawford thoroughly, there is no doubt that cross-
examination was uppermost in Justice Scalia's mind. In three areas of the 
opinion, he cites to or offers his own commentary about how exceptionally 
important it is.219 First, he cites to Wigmore, who stated (when speaking 
about Fenwick's Case) that "Fenwick was condemned, but the proceedings 
212. In re M.H.V.-P., 341 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. App. 2011). 
213. United States v. Rhodes, 61 M.J. 445, 450 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). The Court also stated, "Sev-
eral courts have held that Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Crawford did not overrule 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Owens. We agree." /d. (footnote omitted). 
214. Greenwald, supra note 186, at 170. 
215. 556 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9). 
216. /d. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9). 
217. /d. (quoting United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1323 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
218. /d. (citing United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 
1991 )). 
219. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 49, 61-62. Interestingly, two scholars believe Justice 
Scalia took liberties with his legal history in Crawford. See Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and 
Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light oflts Past, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1, 15-19 (2005). One commentator describes Justice Scalia's historical description of 
the Confrontation Clause as the equivalent of a Hollywood screenplay. Kenneth Graham, 
Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209, 209 (2005). 
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'must have burned into the general consciousness the vital importance of the 
rule securing the right of cross-examination. "'220 Second, he quoted an Anti-
federalist writing that stated, '"Nothing can be more essential than the cross 
examining [of] witnesses. "'221 Finally, Justice Scalia himself declared that 
the Confrontation Clause not only required that evidence be reliable, but 
that it be tested by "the crucible of cross-examination."222 It is difficult to 
believe he meant cross-examination as an empty gesture. Indeed, "[l]ack of 
memory makes it impossible to achieve the 'thorough exploration' the 
drafters of the Federal Rules contemplated.'@ It is more likely that Owens 
has been interpreted too broadly by lower courts, and that during the sixteen 
years between Owens and Crawford, Justice Scalia became increasingly 
convinced of the importance of this constitutional guarantee. 
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinions in Crawford, Davis, 
Giles, and Melendez-Diaz. 224 His dissenting opinion in Bryant is written in a 
passionate tone225 because he believed that the majority strayed too far from 
Crawford and returned to the Owens "reliability" test for Confrontation.226 
He accused the majority of creating a far too "expansive exception to the 
Confrontation Clause for violent crimes," and stated that "a defendant will 
have no constitutionally protected right to exclude the uncross-examined 
testimony of such [a] witness[]. ... The Framers could not have envisioned 
such a hollow constitutional guarantee," again stressing the importance of 
cross-examination. 227 One wonders if Justice Scalia, judging from his Craw-
ford and post-Crawford views, might adopt an analysis more aligned with 
Justices Brennan and Marshall in their Owens dissent, who 
objected to the Court's reasoning and result primarily on the ground that the 
Court's historic emphasis on the right to an opportunity for effective cross-
220. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDfNG THE 
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA§ 1364, at 22 (2d ed. 1923)). 
221. !d. at 49 (second alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD HENRY LEE, 
OBSERVATION LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, 1787, 
reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 466, 
473 (1971)). 
222. !d. at 61. 
223. Greenwald, supra note 186, at 190 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(I)(A) advisory 
committee's note). 
224. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 816 (2006); 
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354 (2008); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305, 306 (2009). 
225. One commentator stated that the majority opinion "enraged Justice Scalia" and 
that the anger in his dissent was "palpable." See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects, 
N.Y. TIMES 0PrNIONATOR (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:40 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects. 
226. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
227. /d. at 1173. 
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examination required more than the "futile" and "formalis[tic]" opportunity "to ask 
questions of a live witness, no matter how dead that witness' memory proves to 
be."22s 
How might the Supreme Court rule on a case involving witness testi-
mony from a person suffering from AD? The Owens case does not neces-
sarily answer that inquiry. Certainly there could be a situation with the same 
scenario as Owens, for example if an AD patient appears on the stand and 
demonstrates current memory loss, yet the prior out-of-court statement is 
stored in his or her long-term memory and he or she is able to testify about 
that prior statement. If the Supreme Court follows Owens in a post-
Crawford world, there would be no Confrontation Clause violation, as the 
witness would be available for cross-examination. As detailed above, how-
ever, it depends entirely upon the stage of the disease at the time of this 
cross-examination. 229 If the lower courts have correctly interpreted Owens 
post-Crawford, then having the AD patient on the stand is enough, and little 
else (if anything) is necessary. Provided the witness is on the stand and is 
able to respond to questions, even with the response, "What are you talking 
about?" the standard has been met, as Owens stresses the opportunity for 
cross-examination rather than the opportunity for effective cross-
examination.230 As indicated above, perhaps the current members of the 
Supreme Court will require more than a mere appearance by the witness on 
the stand. Indeed, in the Fensterer case, the Supreme Court relied upon Jus-
tice Scalia in Owens, stating that when a witness provides "'testimony that 
is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion . . . . the Confrontation 
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair oppor-
tunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination."'231 
D. Owens, Crawford, and Alzheimer's Disease 
The Owens facts are unique. Foster remembered only the statement 
made to Agent Mansfield in the hospital and the very general activities both 
before and after the blows.232 He testified that he did not remember the at-
tack or whether he had seen Owens or anyone else.233 He "could recall vir-
228. Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right ofCorifrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power 
and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1323, 1328 n.27 (1991) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 567, 572 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting)). 
229. See supra Part I. 
230. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559. 
231. Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)). 
232. Owens, 484 U.S. at 556. 
233. /d.; id. at 565-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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tually nothing of the events of April 12, 1982," the day of the attack. 234 He 
did not recall any of the visitors he had at the hospital, except for Agent 
Mansfield.235 It was a rather odd set of circumstances. With Alzheimer's 
disease patients, as reflected above, their testimony will depend entirely 
upon their stage of the disease, as well as their personal circumstances on 
the date of testimony. 
There are four following possibilities with the AD witness: 
1 2 3 4 
No memory No memory Memory while Memory while on 
while on the while on the on the stand of the stand of out of 
stand of out of stand of out of out of court court statement 
court statement court statement statement 
Memory while No memory Memory while No memory while 
on the stand of while on the on the stand of on the stand of 
underlying issue stand of under- underlying issue underlying issue 
lying issue 
The Owens situation is reflected in possibility number four above. In 
the event that the Owens decision is still viable post-Crawford, admission of 
the out-of-court statement is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
With respect to possibility number three above, there would be no Confron-
tation Clause violation, even if the earlier out-of-court statement was testi-
monial, because the witness would be available for cross-examination. Odd-
ly enough, some courts have interpreted Owens as allowing possibility 
number two without having a Confrontation Clause violation.236 As dis-
cussed above, it is difficult to imagine under current Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence that this possibility would pass muster in the event the earlier 
out-of-court statement was testimonial. 237 Because the witness is on the 
234. !d. 
235. !d. at 565. 
236. See, e.g., Vaska v. State, 74 P.3d 225, 228-29 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003), rev'd on 
other grounds, 135 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2006). In the Court of Appeals decision, the Court 
stated the following: 
"The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall either the un-
derlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous testi-
mony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given, does not 
have Sixth Amendment consequence. The prosecution has no less fulfilled its obli-
gation simply because a witness has a lapse of memory. The witness is, in my 
view, available." 
!d. at 229 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 188 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
The Court cites to many other states' opinions in footnote twenty-nine of the opinion. !d. at 
229 n.29. 
23 7. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. 
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stand and available for cross-examination under possibility number one, that 
out-of-court statement should be allowed under the Confrontation Clause. 
Of course if any of these statements is non-testimonial, there would be no 
Confrontation Clause issue. 
Possibility number two has never been an issue before the Supreme 
Court, despite lower court rulings claiming this was the factual situation in 
the Owens case. 238 It was not. If this possibility were allowed, then the right 
to confront is certainly an empty promise, as all that is necessary is a live 
body on the stand. Given Crawford and post-Crawford cases, it is difficult 
to imagine the Supreme Court would find adequate constitutional guaran-
tees in that situation. "Although it is possible that mere physical presence on 
the stand is all that the Confrontation Clause requires, the Supreme Court 
has never taken such a view, which is inconsistent with the importance the 
Court has placed, in addition to physical presence, on the opportunity for 
cross-examination."239 There are a number of lower court cases involving 
children and limited cross-examination, due either to court-ordered limita-
tions or the result of the questioning itself reaching similar results.240 
In a recent Supreme Court of Mississippi opinion, the Court stated the 
following: "In the wake of Owens and Crawford, many courts have found 
that a declarant's appearance and subjection to cross-examination at trial are 
all that is necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even if his or her 
memory is faulty."241 The Court decided otherwise, however, in a case that 
presented the facts of possibility two above.242 Amanda Goforth, a former 
high school teacher, was charged with sexual battery of a minor.243 Chase 
Rigdon, a friend of the victim, gave a testimonial written out-of-court 
statement to the police and this provided possibly the "most damaging evi-
dence against Goforth."244 Rigdon did appear at trial, but between the time 
of the written statement and the trial, he was severely injured in an automo-
bile accident and at trial had no memory of the written statement, or of ever 
having met or known Goforth or the victim. 245 The Court indicated that if 
the only requirement of the Confrontation Clause was the physical presence 
238. See infra text accompanying note 241; see also State v. Delos Santos, 238 P.3d 
162, 179 (Haw. 2010); People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1016-18 (Colo. 2004); 
Mercer v. United States, 864 A.2d II 0, 113-15 (D.C. 2004). 
239. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 596 (2005). 
240. Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a "Testimonial" 
World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 
I 021-22 (2007). 
241. Goforth v. State, 2010-KA-01341-SCT (~ 48) (Miss. 2011). 
242. /d. (~~ 25, 55). 
243. /d. (~ I). 
244. !d. (~~ 24-25, 58). 
245. /d. (~ 25). 
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of the declarant, that requirement had been met.246 The Court instead fol-
lowed the lead of the Seventh Circuit in Cookson v. Schwartz and decided 
the Sixth Amendment demanded more.247 The Court stated, "This total lack 
of memory deprived Goforth any opportunity to inquire about potential bias 
or the circumstances surrounding Rigdon's statement. In sum, Goforth 
simply had no opportunity to cross-examine Rigdon about his statement."248 
A witness suffering from Alzheimer's disease could present any of the 
possibilities above, because the disease is progressive and affects the 
memory of newly learned material before it affects long-term memory. Be-
low is a discussion of what courts may do in the future to meet the challeng-
es presented by a witness with AD. 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND ADVICE FOR A FUTURE WITH ALZHEIMER'S 
DISEASE 
Of course, the best solution for the "gray tsunami" and the consequent 
increase in the number of cases of AD is a cure, o.r ._!>arring that, a way to 
prevent or delay the symptoms of the disease.249 Unfortunately, some of the 
most highly anticipated medicines thought to slow or halt AD have failed in 
the latter stages oftesting.250 Nevertheless, there is some hope for the future, 
as the Eli Lilly drug that failed did show some promise for patients with 
mild AD.251 While continuing to hope for a cure or a method to delay or 
decrease the symptoms of AD, below are some ideas for assisting AD pa-
tients while maintaining justice for parties, defendants, and victims. 
First, as indicated above, the symptoms of AD differ depending upon 
the particular patient and the progression of the disease. 252 If patients are in 
the early stages of the disease, they may have clear memories on certain 
topics.253 Neuroscientist James McGaugh of the University of California at 
Irvine has indicated that "(t]he ability to consolidate and store new memo-
246. !d. (~ 50). 
247. !d. (~,[34, 50-52). 
248. !d. (~53). 
249. See David Brooks, The Fertility Implosion, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2012, at A25; 
Phillip Longman, Think Again: Global Aging, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Nov. 2010, at 52; see supra 
text accompanying notes 7, 31. 
250. See Scott Hensley, Failure of Lilly Drug Is Latest Alzheimer's Setback, NPR 
SHOTS (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.npr.org!blogs/health/2012/08/24/159997459 
/failure-of-lilly-drug-is-latest-alzheimers-setback; Shirley S. Wang & Jonathan D. Rockoff, 
Setback for Alzheimer's Drug, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB 100008723963904432954045775454 707244 79292.html. 
251. Andrew Pollack, Alzheimer's Drug Misses Goal, but Offers Hint of Potential, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/business/mixed-results-in-
lilly-test-of-alzheimers-drug.html? _r=O. 
252. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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ries is the first thing to go .... Established memories hang out for a long 
time."254 In fact, "[i]n the early stage of Alzheimer's long term memory is 
not impaired. People with early Alzheimer's disease can easily remember 
many details about their childhood and other earlier phases of their life."255 
One study revealed that Alzheimer's patients lose skills in the very same 
order they developed them as a child.256 Accordingly, if the subject matter of 
their testimony is something stored in the patient's long-term memory, he or 
she should have no difficulty remembering the circumstances and issues. 
It has been acknowledged that all witnesses have problems with their 
memories when testifying about eyewitness identifications.257 This issue has 
recently been addressed by the Supreme Court in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
with the Court stating: "We do not doubt either the importance or the falli-
bility of eyewitness identifications."258 Justice Sotomayor went even further 
in her dissent: "This Court has long recognized that eyewitness identifica-
tions' unique confluence of features-their unreliability, susceptibility to 
suggestion, powerful impact on the jury, and resistance to the ordinary tests 
of the adversarial process--can undermine the fairness of a trial.,z59 Alt-
hough memory is thought to be a fixed entity, this is not the case: "Hun-
dreds of studies have cataloged a long list of circumstances that can affect 
how memories are recorded and replayed, including the emotion at the time 
of the event, the social pressures that taint its reconstruction, even flourishes 
unknowingly added after the fact."260 Numerous studies have been published 
about the "mechanics and psychology" of witness identifications.261 These 
studies include the effect of a number of variables, such as "the presence of 
a weapon, consumption of alcohol or drugs, how long a witness watched," 
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and more, on eyewitness memory.262 In Perry, the Supreme Court indicated 
that some states allow expert testimony on "the hazards of eyewitness iden-
tification evidence."263 One solution to the issues with a witness suffering 
from AD may be to allow expert witness evidence about the stages in which 
the memory is lost due to AD, in much the same way as it is presented in 
eyewitness memory situations. 
As noted above, a witness with AD may have good days and bad 
days.264 The AD sufferer also may have times during the day when he or she 
is better able to access memories.265 A judge, prosecutor, or defense lawyer 
should be aware of these fluctuations in the abilities of the witness and 
make allowances for the testimony. For example, if a witness with AD is 
consistently better with her memory in the morning, steps could be taken to 
allow that witness to testify in the morning. There will be an increasing 
need for attorneys to advocate on behalf of a witness with AD. Judges will 
be unaware of potential issues due to AD, and it is therefore essential that 
the attorneys inform and educate judges and suggest ways to accommodate 
witnesses. 
When faced with issues involving AD, judges could be liberal in their 
allowance of depositions to perpetuate testimony under both Rule of Civil 
Procedure 27 and Rule of Criminal Procedure 15. Ordinarily, these deposi-
tions are considered an extraordinary discovery device, particularly in the 
criminal arena. 266 In fact, the wording of Criminal Rule 15 requires "excep-
tional circumstances and ... the interest of justice. "267 The purpose of both 
rules is to perpetuate testimony for trial because there is a risk that the tes-
timony will be lost if not preserved.268 The age and/or health of a witness 
may constitute such extraordinary circumstances.269 It is within a judge's 
discretion to allow depositions to perpetuate testimony.270 Given the very 
nature of AD, which is characterized by gradual loss of memory beginning 
with matters just learned and ending with long-term memories, judges 
should use this tool to preserve what memory the witness with AD still re-
tains before there is further loss. In the criminal context, this may of course 
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bring up Confrontation Clause issues.271 In a case that considered this issue, 
the judge ruled that the Confrontation Clause did not apply because there 
was no "prosecution" or an "accused" at the time of the deposition.272 Even 
if the Confrontation Clause applied, the judge determined that there was no 
violation, as the defendants had had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
elderly witnesses at the depositions.273 
Courts and attorneys would be wise to consider changes and ad-
vancements in technology and medicine in order to assist a witness suffer-
ing from AD. For example, psychologists and psychiatrists have suggested 
the "Cognitive Interview" (CI) method to improve the interview process.274 
In addition, studies have been conducted on how to enhance memory, for 
example by implanting a memory-enhancing chip into rats. 275 Undoubtedly 
there will be more medical and technological advances in this area to assist 
those who suffer from AD, their families, and the justice system. In early 
2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the National Alzheimer's 
Project Act (NAPA).276 The Act is effective until 2025, and the Obama Ad-
ministration has invested $50 million into Alzheimer's disease research in 
fiscal year 2012 and $80 million into research in fiscal year 2013.277 
CONCLUSION 
It is beyond question that there will be a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of people within the justice system who suffer from AD in the years 
ahead.278 This increase will affect trial testimony, and consequently, courts 
and attorneys will frequently have to come to grips with this trend. Whether 
a person suffering from AD is considered competent to testify or is consid-
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ered available or unavailable for purposes of hearsay, and whether the con-
straints of the Confrontation Clause are met are issues which must neces-
sarily be addressed. Each AD patient is unique, but there are stages to this 
progressive disease. 
In all but the final stage of the disease, the witness who suffers from 
AD will likely be deemed a competent witness under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 601.279 For hearsay purposes under Rule 804, courts determine 
whether the witness's testimony is unavailable, rather than whether the wit-
ness herself is unavailable.280 Whether a witness's testimony is considered 
unavailable is dependent upon the stage of AD. A witness, according to the 
reasoning in Owens, may be on the witness stand and nevertheless be 
deemed unavailable for purposes of the hearsay rules. Given the fast-paced 
changes in the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,281 judges and at-
torneys need to remain vigilant in following changes in jurisprudence in this 
area. Even experts are unsure how to interpret recent Supreme Court cases. 
Defendants are guaranteed the right to confront their accusers, even if their 
accuser is suffering from diminished memory due to AD. Attorneys will 
need to advocate for the needs of those who suffer from AD, and courts 
should be willing to accommodate the needs of the sufferer while also bal-
ancing the needs of the parties and the constitutional rights of defendants. 
There is an urgent need to study the effect of AD on witness testimo-
ny, as there has been virtually no research on this subject to date.282 It is 
essential for the courts and attorneys to capture memories of the witne!)s 
with AD before they are gone. The Federal Rules of Evidence were de-
signed to allow for necessary flexibility when our society and culture 
change. In the absence of a cure for AD or a significant medical break-
through to stem the tide of AD cases, flexibility for this cultural change is 
absolutely essential in the years ahead. 
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